Fix ThreatCostCalculator: per-unit division, scrap fallback, fixpoint, staggered-recipe max
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@@ -373,31 +373,3 @@ in `requirements.md` and the git history). Still open:
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one matching deposit tile). Touches REQ-BLD-MINER ("every asteroid
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tile is equivalent" no longer holds), REQ-GW-ASTEROID-EXPAND /
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REQ-EXP-*, `world.toml`, and `visuals.toml`.
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6. **Scrap-consuming recipes as threat fallback only.** Amend
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REQ-THREAT-ITEM: recipes that take scrap as an input participate in
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an item's threat computation only if no scrap-free recipe (miner,
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smelter, or assembler) produces that item — mirroring the existing
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rule for the reprocessing path. Otherwise the scrap→ingot smelter
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recipe would inflate the basic materials' threat via the
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max-across-recipes rule, poisoning every downstream value.
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7. **Per-unit item threat.** Amend REQ-THREAT-ITEM and
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`ThreatCostCalculator`: a recipe's threat is divided by its output
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amount, so item threat is production-seconds *per unit*. Currently a
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recipe producing 2 copper_wire per run assigns each wire the full
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run's threat, double-pricing multi-output items and everything
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downstream of them.
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8. **Fixpoint resolution in ThreatCostCalculator.** Items downstream of
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reprocessing-only items (e.g. capital parts built from the scrap-only
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input) never resolve, because resolution stops after the reprocessing
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pass instead of iterating; their consumers silently drop the missing
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materials, so capital hull threat is currently underestimated (found
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by `tools/threat_report.py`, which implements the correct fixpoint).
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9. **Max rule across staggered recipes in ThreatCostCalculator.** An
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item is committed at the first iteration where *any* of its recipes
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resolves, taking the max only over the recipes resolvable at that
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point. A shallow shortcut recipe (e.g. steel plate from raw ore)
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resolves one iteration earlier than the base path and wins, silently
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underpricing the item and everything downstream — violating the
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"shortcuts are pure rewards" rule. Fix: commit an item's threat only
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once every eligible recipe for it is computable (as
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`tools/threat_report.py` does), with a fallback for recipe cycles.
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